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Abstract 
 
As the case with most countries across Latin America, unprecedented migration to urban 
areas has strained city infrastructure systems. More particularly, the region faces a 
pressing crisis of water security, where rapid urbanization has outpaced water sector 
development. This thesis addresses the water infrastructure reform in El Alto and La Paz, 
Bolivia, focusing on strategies to better promote water access for the peri-urban poor. 
The research investigates the level of progressivity of water service expansion and 
pricing regimes: in other words, does the present model of water distribution positively 
improve the lives of the poorest groups? By investigating these social dimensions of 
water management, this study brings perspectives on the broader dialogue on Bolivia’s 
economic development, along with issues of participatory governance. 
 
Resumen: Como es el caso en muchos países latinoamericanos, la migración a áreas 
urbanas a niveles sin precedentes ha superado la capacidad de infraestructura. 
Concretamente, la región se enfrenta a una urgente crisis en la seguridad de agua potable 
dado que la rápida urbanización ha sobrepasado el desarrollo de este sector. Esta tesis 
aborda la reforma de la infraestructura de agua potable en El Alto y La Paz, Bolivia, 
enfocando en las estrategias para mejorar el acceso a agua por parte de los residentes 
periurbanos pobres. La investigación averigua el nivel de progresividad de los regímenes 
de precios y expansión de servicios de agua potable. En otras palabras, ¿contribuye el 
actual modelo de distribución de agua al mejoramiento de la vida de los grupos más 
desfavorecidos? Al investigar estas dimensiones sociales en el manejo de agua potable, 
este estudio ofrece perspectivas en cuanto al diálogo amplio del desarrollo económico de 
Bolivia, así como asuntos de gobernanza participativa.   
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Chapter One 
As the case with most countries across Latin America, unprecedented migration to 
urban areas has strained city infrastructure systems. More particularly, the region faces a 
pressing crisis of water security, where rapid urbanization has outpaced water sector 
development (Rossing, 2010; Wade, 2012). Such growth has placed immense pressures 
on governments already struggling to deliver basic services. These demographic changes, 
along with climate change, have brought enormous complexities on water management, 
requiring a multidimensional approach to policymaking (Barraqué and Zandaryaa, 2012). 
In the face of these challenges, cities across the region have experimented with a mix of 
policy options towards water infrastructure reform. The outcomes of these strategies 
merit thorough analysis, as water access is intrinsically tied to poverty alleviation and the 
promotion of human well-being (ADB, 2004; OECD, 2012).  There is also a spatial 
component, as peri-urban (peripheral) areas tend to receive significantly less service 
connectivity, disproportionally affecting the poor. In consideration of these implications, 
the issue of participatory decision-making holds greater salience when addressing such 
challenges.  
This thesis addresses the peri-urban areas of El Alto and La Paz, where limitations 
in water access adversely affect low income groups. The city of El Alto, the neighboring 
Maxwell  2 
 
sister city of Bolivia’s capital, has only been recognized as its own municipality since 
1985, during a time of incredible growth.
1
 Much of this growth has been “uncontrolled,” 
with illegal settlements leaving an urban sprawl over an extensive geographic area 
(Linden, 1996).
2
 As a result, the young municipality lacks the institutional capacity to 
provide public services to meet these new demands. The water sector is no exception, 
where the municipalities of El Alto and La Paz have reached a crossroad on the future of 
water governance.
3
 The public provider is challenged by administrative and technical 
incapacities; along with inefficient water use, vis-à-vis the issue of non-metered usage. 
Moreover, low rates of investment for have undercut service-coverage expansion goals. 
This issue is particularly salient for peri-urban areas, as residents often rely on alternative 
sources of water which may be unreliable and unsafe (Sima and Elimelech, 2011).
4
 
Inaccessibility to formal water connections is coupled with alarmingly high rates of 
poverty – in El Alto, 48 percent of residents live in moderate poverty, 25 percent live “on 
the verge” of poverty, and 17 percent live in extreme poverty.5 
  El Alto and La Paz are also fragmented by large disparities in socioeconomic 
differences, which have been reinforced by gaps in water access. Both spatially- and 
demographically- defined inequalities may be found in the region. The metropolitan 
region of La Paz, seated high in the Andes, may be divided into three sections: the 
wealthiest residents live within the valley, while low-income households are concentrated 
along the steep slopes of the valley (or “laderas”) or the expanding peri-urban El Alto 
area.
6
 Disparities in basic services are remarkably noticeable between these urban 
subsections. Within the realm of water, in-house water connections stand at 35 percent 
coverage in El Alto, compared to 65 percent in La Paz.
7
 More generally, only half of the 
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population has access to clean water in peri-urban areas.
8
 If water security is understood 
as an intrinsic component of human well-being, these striking disparities cannot be 
overlooked when addressing poverty. In this local context, this thesis intends to explore 
the linkages of inclusive water development and the promotion of livelihoods.  
Given these challenges, this study will explore trends to propose policy 
considerations for equitable infrastructure reform. This thesis will focus on pro-poor 
strategies to promote water access, concerning the affordability and enlargement of 
public water services. Study questions include technical and environmental 
considerations of expansion, as a larger system would demand increased water resource 
extraction. The economic issues are also explored, which encompasses project financing, 
long-term maintenance, overall system efficiency, and tariff structures. Tariff structures 
and cost recovery may first appear to be technical, but such aspects have a direct 
distributional effect with social repercussions.
9
 The research focuses on the level of 
progressivity of water service expansion and tariff regimes: in other words, does the 
present model of water distribution positively improve the lives of the poorest groups? 
By investigating these social dimensions of water management, this study brings 
perspectives on the broader dialogue on Bolivia’s economic development, along with 
issues of participatory governance.  
The urban area of La Paz-El Alto provides an exceptional case study to examine 
the challenges of urban water provision, with a rich narrative of social and political 
transformation. Over the past decade, water conflicts in Cochabamba and La Paz have 
left an indelible legacy on water governance and the broader understanding of water 
rights. These social movements rejected the privatization of municipal water concessions, 
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with various groups invoking the right to customary practices (commonly referred to as 
“usos y costumbres”). Despite the subsequent re-nationalization of water services, 
improved water access for the poor continues to be limited. The debate on privatization 
comes at a time of a global water crisis, where state and private actors have reached a 
crossroads on water security (UNDP, 2006; World Bank, 2006). The events in Bolivia 
reflect the close linkages between urban water management and broader socioeconomic 
issues, along with environmental realities. In consideration of these implications, the 
issue of participatory decision-making has been at the forefront of Bolivia’s water wars. 
The demand for social inclusion in water management policymaking intersects with a 
broader national dialogue of pluralism and good governance. 
 
Evolving Rights, Conflicts and Actors 
 The Bolivian water wars became the first large-scale rejection of privatization in 
Latin America. The track record of infrastructure privatization across Latin America has 
been exceptionally turbulent, with its perceived failure leading to violent street riots, 
public demonstrations, and re-nationalization programs (Estache, Gomez-Lobo, and 
Leipziger, 2001; McKenzie and Mookherjee, 2003; Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2005). 
The regional neoliberal reforms beginning in the 1980s, and later reinforced by the 
Washington Consensus, have brought “a nexus” of state actors, multinational 
corporations, international financial institutions, and organized civil society groups into 
the water development sector.
10
 In the context of Bolivia, the shift toward neoliberal 
structural readjustments came in 1985, with the “New Economic Policy” (NEP). 11 
Preluding these reforms were a series of internal crises attributed to the fiscal 
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mismanagement of military regimes. The stagnating tin industry could no longer sustain 
Bolivia’s massive public debt, forcing members of the government to pursue neoliberal 
policies. This resulted in widespread privatization of state-owned industries, namely the 
national tin industry and the national electric company, spearheaded by President 
Sánchez de Lozada. Although the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) were strong proponents of these reforms, the initial acceptance of neoliberalism 
came from Bolivia’s leaders. 
 By 1997, the Bank began pushing for the privatization of Cochabamba’s water 
system, as a condition for a two-year loan extension.
12
 In this context, the Bolivian 
government sold the concession to the only bidder, Aguas del Tunari, a subsidiary of the 
Bechtel corporation. This transfer to a private provider was made legal through Law 2029 
(the Drinking and Sanitation Law of 1999), which passed quickly “with little public 
knowledge, deliberation, or public support.”13 It superseded the 1906 Ley de Aguas which 
gave municipality the responsibility to govern the distribution of urban water. The new 
law introduced the legal framework for water supply concessions, where existing water 
cooperatives would be forced to enter into contracts with the concessionaires (Assies, 
2003). It also removed water subsidies and allowed the price of water to reflect the “true 
economic cost of the service,” as negotiated between the private operator and the 
regulator.
14
 Concessions were set for a period up to 40 years, and it was expected that the 
water supply of 41 cities would be brought under the concession regime.
15
 
Within the water sector, privatization in Cochabamba would be the first to meet 
violent civil opposition. The 1999 contract to Aguas de Turani demanded full system 
cost-recovery. Not only did tariffs dramatically increase, but meters were placed on wells 
Maxwell  6 
 
that have been managed by small farmer groups. In reaction, demonstrations began in the 
countryside with the irrigators’ movement, later unifying with the urban movement. The 
coalition staged three major city wide strikes, with blockades closing the two main 
highways entering and exiting the city. ¡El aqua es nuestra, carajo! (The water is ours, 
damn it!) became the new catch-phrase of the movement, which would eventually be 
adopted in El Alto. In an interesting twist, the revolt allied with a group of coca farmers 
group led by Evo Morales. With the riots escalating, President Banzer declared a “state of 
siege” and constitutional rights were suspended. This announcement marked a turning 
point in the course of the revolt. After a violent standoff between soldiers and citizens, 
one which left a demonstrator dead, the concessionaire abandoned the concession 
(Shultz, 2008).  
 Although the events Cochabamba should be understood separately from those in 
La Paz, it set an irreversible momentum toward reform across the country. By 2002, 
widespread protests in El Alto-La Paz challenged the Aguas del Illimani concessionaire 
over its failure to expand service to peri-urban areas.  Despite the pro-poor features in the 
initial contract design, such as expansion targets, tariff increases posed a challenge in 
delivering water to the poor (Komives, 1999). The tariffs, indexed at the US dollar, 
increased with the depreciation of the national currency, the Boliviano. This brought per 
capita water consumption from the La Paz system to decrease from 110 to 87 liters per 
day.
16
 Given these tariff hikes, affordability of water services became the central concern 
in low-income areas – and in order to achieve cost recovery objectives, Aguas del 
Illimani had to exclude the poorest neighborhoods from expansion plans. This sparked 
rioting throughout the Bolivian capital, largely mobilized through neighborhood 
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associations in excluded areas. The private operator eventually withdrew in 2005, 
opening a debate on the future of the city’s water management.  
Bolivia’s water conflicts came to reorient politics at the national level, notably 
with the election of Evo Morales and the rise of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) 
government. By chance, these events coincided with the ongoing “gas war,” which 
brought protests over natural gas exportation polices.
17
 Both the water conflict (2001-
2006) and gas war (2003-2005) demonstrated an overwhelming rejection of neoliberalism 
within the country—a precedent that would largely come to define the politics of Evo 
Morales (Harten, 2011; Webber, 2011). As one commentator notes, there was a shared 
sense of being a “victim of neoliberal economics and unresponsive institutions.”18 The 
MAS party was successful in harnessing these uncoordinated social movements for 
popular support, framing these events as an indigenous struggle. This perceived struggle 
would be particularly salient in El Alto, one of the few cities in the world that is almost 
entirely indigenous.
19
 With the MAS in power today, Bolivia’s water sector has been 
pivoted in favor of publicly-managed models for urban infrastructure across the country.   
The Morales presidency introduced a handful of reforms, namely through the 
nationalization of various economic sectors. Years of water conflict renewed the national 
dialogue on water access rights and participatory governance. This is pronounced in the 
constitutional referendum of 2009, which states: “Access to water and sanitation services 
constitutes human rights, and it is not for concession or privatization” (Artículo 20.3).20 
Despite this normative affirmation for water access, key legislation is lacking to govern 
water extraction and allocation.  The National Water Law (Ley de Aguas) has not been 
revised since 1906, becoming irrelevant in prioritizing water users. Several pieces of the 
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legislation directly contradict the constitution’s prohibition of water concessions. In 
addition, the regulatory framework for public water providers remains highly ambiguous, 
leaving the sector with minimal checks and balances. These legal deficits have 
perpetuated the country’s water crisis to this day, years after the transfer to a publicly-
managed system. As this thesis examines infrastructure reform in La Paz, further sections 
will consider the legislative framework needed to promote water access.  
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Notes 
 
1
 While El Alto separated from La Paz in 1985, it was not legally recognized as an 
autonomous municipality until 1988. 
2
 Linden (1996) mentions El Alto among the sprawling cities of the developing world. 
3
 As of June 2013, the Gobierno Autónomo Municipal de La Paz has proposed various 
reforms for the public water utility provider. In addition, the Ministerio de Medio 
Ambiente y Agua (MMAyA) is in the process of developing a master plan for water and 
sanitation services (up to year 2036). 
4
 Refer to Sima and Elimelech (2011). 
5
 Poverty figures are from 2001; Lazar (2008, 32).  
6
 For a detailed account of La Paz-El Alto urban social relations, refer to Arbona and 
Kohl (2004). 
7
 From Table 1 in Arbona (2007, 132).  
8
 Coverage for clean water access is below 50 percent in the peri-urban Mecapaca and 
Achocalla, according to the latest 2001 census. Refer to Cuadro No 1, Objetivo No 7, pp 
16 in INE (2005). 
9
 The term “tariff” will be used interchangeably with “water price structure” and “water 
rates” throughout this document.  
10
 Baer (2008, 195) suggests that “The struggle for access to potable water is at the nexus 
of the larger battle between states, multinational corporations, international financial 
institutions, and organized groups of citizens in Latin America.” 
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11
 These readjustment policies were spearheaded by the Minister of Planning, Gonzalo 
Sánchez de Lozada, who would later serve as President of Bolivia, 1993-1997 and 2002-
2003. 
12
 World Bank, 2002, 1. 
13
 Baer, 2008, 201. 
14
 Baer, 2008, 201. 
15
 Assies, 2003, 17.  
16
 Komives, 1999. 
17
 The “gas wars” of Bolivia escalated in October 2003, events which some refer to as 
“Red October.” The protests were in response to the government’s decision to export 
natural gas via a Chilean port, under President “Goni” Sanchez. The gas concession was 
awarded to the Pacific LNG consortium, which had the expectation of transporting gas 
from the Margarita gas field to markets in Mexico and California. The regulatory 
environment had been perceived to be too much in favor of transnational firms, as the 
“Bolivian operations of BP Amoco and Repsol YPF benefited from the lowest operating 
costs for oil and gas exploration and production.” In addition, the choice of the Chilean 
port (the most economical) raised nationalist sentiments among the Bolivians – as the 
landlocked country lost its coastal territory to Chile in the War of the Pacific in the 
1870s. Led Óscar Olivera, La Coordinadora Nacional por la Defensa del Gas (the 
National Coordinator for the Defense of Gas) was formed, in conjunction with the 
activities of FEJUVE and other neighborhood associations. Political pressure was also 
brought by Bolivia’s major labor union, the Bolivian Workers Central. What began as a 
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movement for “gas por Perú” (as a rejection of the Chilean port) turned into a rejection of 
gas exports altogether – after the military reportedly killed 20 people in El Alto in 
October 2003. The massacre incited 8000 miners to march through La Paz from the high 
plains of Altiplano. All within the day of which the miners reached La Paz, Goni had 
resigned and fled to the United States. Refer to Perreault (2006) and Lazar (2008). 
18
 Harten, 2011, 107. 
19
 From the 2001 census, 74 percent of El Alto residents defined themselves as Aymara 
(Lazar, 2006, 186). 
20
 [Author’s translation from the 2009 Constitution:] “República del Bolivia: 
Constitución de 2009,” Political Database of the Americas, Edmund A. Walsh School of 
Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Online (5 Jul 2011, accessed on 26 June 2013): 
< http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Bolivia/bolivia09.html> 
   
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
The La Paz concession of 1997 became the first major privatization of Bolivia’s 
water sector, opening a bundle of uncertainties. Unlike Cochabamba, the water and 
sanitation situation in La Paz had relatively favorable conditions at the time of its 
privatization.
1
 Nevertheless, infrastructure expansion to the underserved El Alto area 
presented the greatest challenge. Government officials decided to use the concession 
bidding process to maximize water service expansion to low-income neighborhoods. The 
Request for Proposals asked interested companies to submit bids of number of 
connections they would install within El Alto by the end of 2001 (Komives, 1999). This 
differs from typical private sector involvement, where the bidding process seeks the 
lowest possible tariff. In fact, tariffs increased in La Paz with the removal of water 
subsidies a month prior to the concession agreement – a move to disassociate tariff hikes 
with the introduction of a private provider.
2
 As Komives (1999, 21) mentions, “[the] new 
tariff was designed with cost recovery in mind.” Tariffs were indexed to the US dollar 
before being converted to the local currency; with the intention of attracting investors 
(mitigates the risk of inflation). As a result, the bidding process was somewhat 
competitive, producing commitments to greatly expand coverage.
3
 The concession was 
awarded to Aguas del Illimani (the consortium under the French Lyonnaise des Eaux, 
Suez), with a commitment to install 71,752 new in-house connections (in the El Alto 
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subsection alone). This bid significantly surpassed the minimum of 37,922 connections, 
as initially requested by the national government (Kovines, 1999). 
 As with most privatizations, contracts must carefully strike the balance between 
clear mandate specifications (with strong regulatory oversight) and flexibility for the 
concessionaire to ensure efficiency.
4
 The case of La Paz is no exception, as the details in 
the contract design would eventually determine the success or failure of the city’s water 
sector expansion. Several important features of the concession contract with Aguas del 
Illimani stand out as “pro-poor.” The new-connection requirements for the El Alto 
subsystem, as just mentioned, had to be met by December 2001. If the company had 
fallen short by more than 15 percent of this goal, it would have had to pay a penalty of 
US$500 per connection it fails to install. Coverage rates for the other two subsystems had 
to reach 100 percent for water, and 95 percent for sewage by 2021. The regulator had the 
authority to cancel the contract if Aguas del Illimani were to fall short by more than 25 
percent for this mandate. Determining whether or not these requirements had been met 
would have been a challenge for the regulator (in this case, the Superintendencia de 
Aguas). Many homes have been constructed illegally and therefore there was no exact 
count of household units lacking water service. Therefore, the national regulator simply 
relied on population projections to negotiate new-connection requirements with the 
concessionaire – quotas which were determined on a five-year cycle. The contract also 
included expansion requirements to high-density areas, however target deadlines were 
not specified. This gave the private provider some flexibility to determine geographic 
areas which promise future cost recovery. Yet this specific  provision would eventually 
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backlash, as exclusion of certain neighborhoods from expansion projects (in many cases, 
areas that were the poorest) would result in civil contention. 
The contractual arrangements held promising features from the perspective of 
service expansion and cost recovery. In hindsight, how did the private provider perform, 
and what led to the cancellation of the La Paz concession contract in 2005? When Aguas 
del Illimani assumed control in August 1997, the total concession area reached a 
population of 1.4 million (the concession boundaries included areas with and without 
service). The population of La Paz had 800,000 people, of which 48 percent were 
considered poor, and 21 percent self-identified as indigenous. The neighboring El Alto 
subsection was experiencing rapid growth, with a population of 600,000 people, and of 
that figure, over half self-identify as ingenious (IADB, 2007, 109). To meet the new-  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of Events  
 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
LA PAZ 
COCHABAMBA 
 
Author’s elaboration 
 
| April 2000: “Final battle,” protests escalate to riots, concession agreement is terminated 
 
| June 1997: La Paz concession awarded to Aguas del Illimani 
| 1999: Drinking and Sanitation Law (Law 2029) is enacted 
| 2002: Social unrest in El Alto begins  
| 1999: Cochabamba concession awarded to Aguas del Tunari 
| January 2005: Aguas del Illimani cancels contract 
| December 2001: Deadline to meet contractual obligations for service coverage 
| October 2003: “Gas Wars” protests and blockades 
| December 2005: Evo Morales elected president 
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connection requirements. The target coverage rates for 2001 were surpassed in El Alto, 
with 89 percent coverage in water connections (target at 82 percent) and 48 percent in 
sewer connections (target at 41 percent). In La Paz, however, the company did not reach 
full coverage in water services (only at 92 percent in 2001). By 2006, Aguas del Illimani 
brought a total of 100,000 water connections and 78,000 sewer connections (IADB, 2007, 
111). 
By 2002, disputes arose over who would receive the benefits of expansion in El 
Alto. This was at the time when the Superintendencia de Aguas and the concessionaire 
were negotiating new coverage goals for the next five year cycle. There was a mixture of 
claims leading to the renationalization of the water and sewage utility sector in El Alto 
and La Paz. First, there was dissatisfaction from neighborhoods that were within the 
concession area, but continued to lack coverage. The 1997 agreement included an 
expansion mandate, yet it never specified exactly where to expand. This gave the 
Figure 2: Aguas del Illimani Consortium Ownership 
  
  
1997 2001 
 
 
  
Adapted from IADB, 2007
5
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concessionaire some flexibility to optimize expansion for cost recovery. Between the 
expected returns on infrastructure investment, and affordability of the connection fee, one 
may expect that the poorest neighborhoods would be excluded from the expansion. 
Secondly, there was disagreement on whether service coverage should be calculated 
using the municipal boundaries or the concession area. The figures of 2001 refer to 
coverage rates within concession area, and with this interpretation, Aguas del Illimani 
met target coverage goals in El Alto.  Nevertheless, the concessionaire did not meet its 
contractual obligations for new in-house connections: with only 53,000 newly installed 
water connections in El Alto, below the initial target of 71,752 (Marin, 2009, 49). Those 
outside the concession area, on the perimeter of the expanding El Alto, also began 
rotesting for connectivity as well. There was a growing recognition that these areas would 
be excluded from the water system for another 30 years.
6
 These claims fueled widespread 
discontent, with neighborhood associations mobilizing protest and riots across the 
nation’s capital. 
Tariff increases also became a source of contention. As previously mentioned, the 
concession contract had tariffs indexed to the US dollar – and therefore tariffs increased 
with the depreciation of the national currency, the Boliviano (BOB). The average 
domestic user in La Paz paid USD $0.22 per cubic meter of water. These rates were 
comparable, and in some cases lower, to other urban areas within the country: in Sucre 
the domestic rate was set to USD $0.26, in Santa Cruz $0.29, and in Cochabamba $0.27 
(IADB, 2007, 113). The El Alto-La Paz tariff design had an industrial-to-residential cross 
subsidy, and tariffs differed with four categories of consumption. The entire service area 
was under the same tariff rate, except for the southern network subsection, which 
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received higher tariffs. This differs from the tariffs in Cochabamba, where rates vary 
between neighborhoods. Figure 3 illustrates that in 1997 (when Aguas del Illimani was 
introduced) the average domestic water user paid BOB 1.16 per cubic meter of water. By 
2005, the same volume of water would cost BOB 1.76 – an astonishing 50 percent 
increase. This brought per capita water consumption in La Paz to decrease from 110 to 87 
liters per day.
7
 In light of these tariff increases (indexed at the national currency), 
affordability of water services became the central concern in low-income areas – and in 
order to achieve cost recovery objectives, Aguas del Illimani had to exclude the poorest 
neighborhoods from expansion plans. 
 Social unrest over the La Paz concession began in 2002, immediately after the 
national government renegotiated contractual obligations for the concessionaire’s next 
five-year cycle.
9
 At this point, there had already been contention over rising tariffs and 
exclusion from water coverage. As mentioned earlier, Aguas del Illimani fell short of the 
target new in-house water connections for the 2001 deadline. Discontent with these 
Figure 3: USD/BOB Exchange Rates and Water Tariffs 
 
 
Adapted from IADB, 2007
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outcomes was reinforced with a diminishing expansion mandate for the projected future. 
For the proximate five-year cycle, the regulator and the concessionaire negotiated a new 
target of 15,000 new water connections, which later fell to 8,000 in June 2003. Due to 
cost-recovery concerns, the expansion mandate was removed altogether in August 2004 
(Pérez, 2006). This brought the widely heralded “pro-poor” concession into question, as 
the arrangement could no longer sustain expansion. Civil protest, which included road 
blockades, was largely mobilized through neighborhood associations in excluded areas.  
 At the forefront of these demonstrations was the Federación de Juntas Vecinales 
(FEJUVE),
10
 led by Abel Mamani. Rioting escalated in October 2003, as the offices of 
Aguas del Illimani were sacked on a number of occasions (Laurie and Crespo, 2007). By 
chance, these events coincided with the ongoing “gas wars,” which brought opposition to 
President Sanchez de Lazoda’s plans to export Bolivia’s natural gas to Chile. FEJUVE’s 
legitimacy as a political organization was further reinforced by the concurrent contention 
over natural gas resources.  
 The water wars in La Paz drew international attention, as it did in Cochabamba 
several years earlier. Interestingly, FEJUVE received extensive transnational support 
through the creation of the Bolivian Integral Water Management Commission (CGIAB), 
formed in 2000.
11
 The commission brought a forum of international and national NGOs, 
along with technical and consultative support (Laurie and Crespo, 2007).  During the 
negotiations between government officials and FEJUVE in 2005, CGIAB played a key 
intermediary role. By January of that year, Aguas del Illimani declared its intentions to 
withdraw, opening up an entirely new debate on the conditions of withdraw and the new 
management of water services. Transnational auditing firms were resisted by further 
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protests, as the public perceived conflicts of interests with the French Suez subsidiary. In 
addition, the government at the time was pushing for a renewed public-private 
partnership, through the form of a “Sociedad Autónoma Mixta.” FEJUVE again rejected 
this proposal, as the neighborhood federation pushed for a publicly-managed water utility 
system.  
 
Local Trends 
The municipality of El Alto, the neighboring sister city of Bolivia’s capital, has 
been expanding rapidly over the past few decades, with water services lagging behind. 
The combined urban area of El Alto and La Paz has been considered a de facto city – in 
which municipal institutions dynamically adjust to a reinvented social and political 
landscape.
12
 Excessive urbanization has been an ongoing global trend, where local 
governments must confront new multifaceted pressures in response to demographic 
changes (Henderson, 2002; Cohen 2006). As one observer notes, and perhaps 
oversimplifies, “El Alto is a city traversed by problems from all sides” (Antezana, 1993). 
From the onset, poverty rates along the outskirts of El Alto have been alarmingly high: 
according to the latest census in 2001, the poverty rate in Achocalla stood at 52 percent, 
Pucarani 72 at percent, Laja at 74 percent, Viacha at 53 percent – compared to the 
national average at 40 percent.
13
 El Alto has only been recognized as its own 
municipality since 1985, during a time of incredible growth. Throughout that decade, the 
population of El Alto increased by an annual average of 9 percent, and estimates for 2013 
has the population exceeding 1 million.
14
 Much of this growth has been “uncontrolled,” 
with illegal settlements leaving an urban sprawl over an extensive geographic area  
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(Linden, 1996). As a result, the young municipality lacks the institutional capacity to 
provide public services to meet these new demands (refer to Table 1). The water sector is 
no exception, where the municipalities of El Alto and La Paz have reached a crossroads 
on the future of water governance.
15
  
El Alto stands out as the only major city in Latin America which is almost 
entirely indigenous. More specifically, 74 percent of its residents self-identify as 
Aymara.
16
 The city is also characterized by the large proportion of migrant residents from 
the Aymara- and Quechua-speaking rural countryside. Lazar (2004) identifies three main 
migratory waves: following the 1953 Agrarian Reform, the construction boom of the 
1970s, and the neoliberal reforms of 1985 under President Paz. The third event brought a 
wave of migratory miners who were dismissed upon the closure of state-owned mine  
Figure 4: Map of La Paz, El Alto, and Peri-Urban Municipalities 
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operations.
18
 Previous union leadership in mining was transplanted into street trading 
activities in El Alto, leading to the rise of gremialistas (unionized street traders), leaders 
who came to dominate local politics.
19
 This style of unionism would largely shape 
community organization in the area, a point that will be discussed in a further section. 
Migration has also been attributed to crop failures following the El Niño drought of 1982-
83, which affected the livelihoods of 1.6 million people in the rural areas of Potosí, 
Cochabamba, and Oruro (Mariscal et al, 2011).
20
 Due to the high incidence of migration, 
many families establish dual residency in El Alto and their rural community.
21
 
The displacement of miners and farmers has brought unprecedented population 
growth to El Alto, an area which had a population of only 11,000 in 1952. As with most 
cases in low-income countries, rapidly-expanding cities cannot sustain formal job growth. 
Taking its place is a burgeoning informal sector, visible through El Alto’s crowded open  
street markets. Commercial activity is largely concentrated to the Ceja and 16 de Julio 
markets, where one commentator notes: “The Ceja, then, is a place of movement – of 
ebbs and flows of people, vehicles, and produce [...] It is the connecting point for the 
 
 
Table 1: Basic Services in the Metropolitan Region of La Paz 
  
  La Paz (%) El Alto (%) 
Houses made out of brick 53 22 
Houses made out of adobe 46 77 
Water service (in house) 65 35 
Water service (out of house) 36 54 
Households with electricity 95 85 
All basic service needs satisfied  37 7 
 
 
Adapted from Arbona, 2007
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whole city” (Lazar, 2008, 41). Street vendors also take their goods to La Paz – giving El 
Alto the nickname of cuidad dormitorio (literally translates to “bedroom city”), as 
Alteños commonly spend the entire day in La Paz. This aspect speaks to the embedded 
social integration between the two municipalities, despite their institutional separation. 
 The informal economy is a debated subject: on the one hand, it provides work in 
sectors facing underemployment, yet it compromises government regulations, job 
security and social protection schemes (Guha-Khasnobis et al., 2007; ILO, 2013). The 
predominance of street trading activity implies a certain economic vulnerability among 
Alteños. By working outside of the formal sector, most are not protected by worker safety 
laws and lack old-age pensions. There is a gendered component too, as 81 percent of 
working women have “extremely precarious” jobs, compared to their male counterparts, 
at 64 percent.
22
 In addition, employers often extend work hours past the legal norm of 
eight hours. The average working day –measured in hours– is greater in El Alto, when 
contrasted to other major Bolivian cities.
23
 This dimension of economic vulnerability, 
which some may call “living on the edge,” must not be overlooked when discussing 
poverty and water access in El Alto.  
 
Citizen Participation and Political Organization 
From the political perspective, El Alto has a legacy rooted in popular, and 
sometimes militant, protest: leading Lazar (2006) to appropriately label the city as 
“cuidad rebelle.” Contemporary left-indigenous movements against neoliberalism, 
illustrated by the Gas Wars of 2003 and 2005, became the base of the Movimiento al 
Socialismo (MAS) party politics – a party which maintains a majority in the national 
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legislature, and holds the presidency to this day.
24
 The MAS began in Cochabamba with a 
platform against the perceived American imperialism against coca growers, vis-à-vis the 
“war on drugs.” Evo Morales, as president, would later bring the “coca no es droga” 
campaign to the international level, defending the indigenous right to chew coca in 
various speeches before the United Nations.
25
 The politics of MAS would lead to the 
renationalization of various sectors – including water and sanitation services. The party’s 
strong presence in El Alto has the municipality pitted against city government of La Paz, 
which is dominated by the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR). This 
polarization has left efforts for integrated water resource management strained.  
The young and informal municipal institutions of El Alto tend to facilitate a high 
incidence of clientelism (Lauth, 2000).
26
 Here, the provision of public goods is dictated 
by personal exchanges between citizens and political agents. Scott (1972, 92) develops 
the theory of patron-client relations as: 
an exchange relationship between roles […] involving a largely 
instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic 
status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection 
on benefits, or both, for a lower status (client) who, for his part, 
reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal 
services, to the patron. 
In the case of El Alto, this “exchange relationship” is a crucial aspect of everyday life. 
Lazar (2004) notes that “family livelihoods depend on making correct calculations about 
party allegiance since future employment may be linked to party membership.”27 The 
author further notes that when new politicians are elected, they usually fire most of their 
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civil servants and freeze wages. As a result, most Alteños understand that party 
allegiance may be closely tied to financial advantages, such as employment opportunities 
in the public sector. This style of political life largely differs from the municipality of La 
Paz, where institutions are much more established, and hence the provision of public 
goods operates under a more legalistic framework. These two styles of governance pose a 
challenge in integrating water management between El Alto and La Paz. 
In El Alto, most citizen participation occurs through local juntas vecinales, or 
neighborhood councils, which present more of a territorial-based structure of political 
mobilization – a transition away from the traditional class-based unionism of the 
displaced miners. Some observers would argue that the councils retain organizational 
characteristics of the ayllu, or the indigenous Aymara governance system.
28
 In 1989, 
there were only 166 of these neighborhood councils, a figure which increased to almost 
550 in 2006.
29
 Kohl and Farthing (2011, 179) note that these organizations play two key 
roles: “they press municipal governments to install basic urban services and develop 
clientelist relationships with political parties to gain access to those services.”30 Over the 
past decade, these juntas vecinales have been organized under the FEJUVE federation, 
playing an instrumental role throughout the El Alto water conflicts. To this day, the 
federation remains an influential stakeholder within El Alto-La Paz municipal politics, as 
FEJUVE representatives take part in public planning and oversight initiatives. FEJUVE is 
especially significant within the water sector, as its former leader, Abel Mamani, was 
selected to become Bolivia’s first water minister in 2006. Aside from the juntas 
veninales, school associations have become the second most important arena for political 
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mobilization. Interestingly, female participation stands much higher among these school 
associations.
31
 
Within the scope of participatory development, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) play an important, yet debated, role in linking civil society groups with the state. 
Throughout the Banzer dictatorship of the 1970s, NGOs were instrumental in supporting 
pro-democracy groups.
32
 Most of these organizations also affiliated with the Catholic 
Church for legitimacy – in a country where over 80 percent are Catholic.33 NGO activity 
later came to a “boom” throughout the 1980s, with the return of democracy in Bolivia. 
Gill (1997) argues there was an emergence of new NGOs less linked to popular-leftist 
movements and the Catholic Church, but instead ones which took a pro-market, 
neoliberal character. In El Alto, there was a particular focus on supporting growth in the 
microenterprise sector (Arbona, 2001). Yet within the water sector, NGOs continue to 
play an important role in participatory development. Fundación Salón, with its “Octubre 
Azul” campaign, stands at the forefront in efforts to defend water rights.34 While Bolivian 
NGOs have been credited in enhancing local capacity, critics would point toward a local-
level dependency on international funding and expertise (Gill, 1997). 
 As illustrated in earlier sections, the intrinsic differences between El Alto and La 
Paz will carry implications on metropolitan water governance. The political dynamics of 
each city entail completely separate realities of leadership, despite their apparent 
economic integration.  Perhaps the most pronounced feature would be El Alto’s 
“sprawling” growth and the new demand for water. Population growth, largely from 
rural-to-urban migration, has placed immense pressures on local governance – as seen 
through the informal labor sector. Considering that El Alto has only been an autonomous 
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municipality since 1988, El Alto’s institutions are much more vulnerable for political 
manipulation. This vulnerability has facilitated a high incidence of clientelism in local 
politics, where patron relationships eventually determine the allocation of public 
resources. 
 Given this context, the discussion on urban water management may be better 
understood from the perspective of local capacity. This notion of “capacity” refers to the 
ability of governments and organizations to achieve desired outcomes from an 
implemented strategy. Within the scope of water governance, the public policy process is 
hampered by various constraints: and perhaps the most visible limitation comes with the 
politics of water tariff pricing. In theory, tariffs rates should be determined with cost-
recovery in mind, in order to ensure the fiscal sustainability of the system. The normative 
view supporting the human right for water, however, suggests that tariffs should be 
reduced for the poor. Poverty rates are remarkably high in El Alto, giving the latter point 
overwhelmingly more salience. In addition, recent social movements toward the 
renationalization of water resources further defend this normative view, along with the 
overall promotion of universal water access. 
 
Water Sector Reform at a Crossroads 
The 2006 elections and the new Evo Morales presidency brought a complete 
reorientation of national water policies. The Ministry of Environment and Water 
(MMAYA) was formed, with the former leader of FEJUVE, Abel Mamani, installed as 
minister. The constitutional referendum of 2009 brought a renewed focus on natural 
resource policy, with its recognition of customary user rights. The preamble even 
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acknowledges that the constitution was “inspired” by social struggles, including the 
“Guerra del Agua:” 
El pueblo boliviano, de composición plural, desde la profundidad de la 
historia, inspirado en las luchas del pasado […] en las luchas populares de 
liberación, en las marchas indígenas, sociales y sindicales, en las guerras 
del agua y de octubre […] construimos un nuevo Estado. (Preámbulo)35 
This affirmation essentially underscores the significance of Bolivia’s social unrest in 
defining a “new State.” Moreover, this turbulent history of natural resource contention 
undoubtedly set the tone for the Evo Morales presidency, and national politics as a whole.    
At the national level, ANESAPA was formed to publicly-manage water services, 
which includes the La Paz-EL Alto subdivision (referred to as EPSAS).
36
 The new public 
operator inherits the same challenges of service coverage and network expansion, in the 
face of rapid urbanization. Given this new political and institutional environment, it is 
important to investigate the current state of water service provision, with a focus on pro-
poor strategies for water access and long-term sustainability.  
 To this day, six years after its creation, EPSAS finds itself in an incredibly 
precarious state: marked with poor management and an inability to fulfill contractual 
obligations. In an unprecedented move, the regulator took complete control of the EPSAS 
in April 2013.
37
 The intervention allows the regulator to assume all of operations and 
management responsibilities for a period of six months – and by the end of the 
intervention, the central government will introduce a reformed EPSAS. This places the 
Government of Bolivia, more particularly the Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Agua 
(MMAyA), at a crossroads on water governance reform. The key question is how to 
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create a more accountable and efficient public service provider, at a time of management 
crisis.  
 The regulator justified the intervention on various grounds, from poor risk 
management to environmental degradation. Nevertheless, a broader and more 
fundamental issue is yet to be addressed: as to what form of governance would most 
effectively manage water delivery for the region. This would require that stakeholders 
find the balance between regulatory powers at the national level, and autonomy at the 
local municipal level. There is also the question of integrating the municipalities in a 
consortium (or multiple consortia), for more optimal water management. Water 
governance in La Paz-El Alto must be restructured during this intervention, as required 
by law. For this reason, the two municipalities, along with its satellite cities, stand at a 
critical juncture on the future of natural resource management. 
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Notes 
 
1
 In Cochabamba, only 57 percent of the city’s residents were connected to the system, 
with water available for an average of 4 hours per day – at the time of the 1999 
concession award. This contrasts the La Paz water utility situation, which had relatively 
high coverage rates and water availability for an average of 19 hours a day. (Spronk and 
Webber, 2007, 39) 
2
 According to IADB (2007), tariffs increased from 21 percent to 57 percent in every 
category, when compared to 1996 rates. 
3
 The bidding process remained competitive, with International Water Limited 
withdrawing “at the last minute,” (Komives, 1999, 13). 
4
 Public-private partnerships and contract arrangements will be reviewed in a further 
section.  
5
 IADB, 2007, 108. 
6
 The geographic boundaries of the concession area would have to be renegotiated after 
the end of the concessionaire’s 30-year term. 
7
 World Bank, 2002, 2. 
8
 The reported tariff for domestic water use was set at USD$0.22 (IADB, 2007, Cuadro 
B.3). To determine the annual tariff rate in Bolivanos, historical USD/BOB exchange 
rates were multiplied with the tariff. 
9
 There were several movements prior to 2002, as water pump facilities were sabotaged 
in November 2000. The following month, El Alto residents also marched the streets of La 
Paz, announcing the beginning of the ‘second water war.’ January 2002, as explained in 
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this section, marked the turning point of discontent with the private provider’s outcomes. 
(Laurie and Crespo, 2007, 844) 
10
 Translates to the “Federation of Neighborhood Councils [of El Alto].” 
11
 Referred to as “La Comisión para la Gestión Integral del Agua en Bolivia” 
(<http://www.aguabolivia.org>). 
12
 In another context, La Paz is commonly referred to as a de facto capital city, as it seats 
the offices of the central government. The constitutional and historical capital city, on the 
other hand, is Sucre. 
13
 INE, 2005. 
14
 For population growth rate, refer to “Tabla 1.1” on pp 8; and for population estimates, 
refer to “Tabla 1.11” on pp 15:] MMAyA, “Informe sobre demandas futuras y estrategias 
de expansión: Resumen ejecutivo,” Plan Maestro Metropolitano de Agua Potable y 
Saneamiento La Paz – El Alto, Bolivia, Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Agua 
(MMAyA), Junio 2013.  
15
As of June 2013, the Gobierno Autónomo Municipal de La Paz has proposed various 
reforms for the public water utility provider. In addition, the Ministerio de Medio 
Ambiente y Agua (MMAyA) is in the process of developing a master plan for water and 
sanitation services (up to year 2036). 
16
 Lazar, 2008, 2.  
17
 Refer to Table 1 in Arbona, 2007, 132. 
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18
 The closures of state-owned mines were part of the economic restructuring under 
Supreme Decree 21060, and the “New Economic Policy (NEP)”. These reforms were part 
of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund for $57 million in credit. 
19
 Lazar, 2008, 244. 
20
 In Bolivia, an estimated 85 percent of the potato crop and 50 percent of quinoa and 
broad bean crops were lost in the El Niño drought of 1982-83 (Mariscal et al., 2011, 14). 
21
 Mariscal et al., 2011, 40. 
22
 Weber, 2011, 212. 
23
 Weber, 2011, 212. 
24
 Officially refered to as “Moviemento al Socialismo – Instrumento Politico por la 
Soberania de los Puebleos” (MAS-IPSP). 
25
 Morales Ayma, 2009. 
26
 Lauth (2000) describes how informal institutions are often characterized by clientelism 
and corruption. 
27
 Lazar, 2008, 229. 
28
 Similarities between the El Alto neighborhood councils and the ayllu system are briefly 
mentioned by Arbona (2007, 132); Kohl and Farthing (2011, 179). 
29
 Khol and Farthing, 2011, 179. 
30
 Kohl and Farthing, 2011, 179. 
31
 According to Lazar (2008), there is an approximate two-thirds female participation rate 
in school associations, where the inverse is true for neighborhood council participation. 
32
 Gill, 1997. 
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33
 LAPOP, “Perspectivas,” Barómetro de las Américas, Vanderbuilt University (2009), 
online: < http://www.amerciasbarometer.org > 
34
 Fundación Salón, 2010. 
35
 [Author’s translation:] “The people of Bolivia, of plural composition, ever since the 
depth of history, inspired by past struggles […] and popular struggles for liberty, in 
indigenous, social and labor marches, in the water wars and the October war […] we 
have built a new state.”  
36
 “Asociación Nacional de Empresas del Servicio de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado” 
(ANESAPA) and “Empresa Pública Social de Agua y Saneamiento” (EPSAS). 
37
 “Intervención de EPSAS,” La Razón, seción editorial (03 Apr 2013), Online, accessed 
01 Aug 2013: 
 < http://www.la-razon.com/opinion/editorial/Intervencion-EPSAS_0_1808219171.html > 
   
 
 
 
Chapter Three 
 The recent water conflicts in La Paz and El Alto demonstrate the demands for 
inclusive infrastructure systems, with an emphasis on meeting the needs of marginalized 
urban areas. Furthermore, this backlash against water privatization reveals an inherent 
paradox in infrastructure reform. From the normative level, there is a provocative 
proposition that defends the human right to water – one which separates water resources 
from other economic goods. Nevertheless, water pricing regimes should be designed for 
system cost recovery, in order to ensure long-term resource viability. This is what makes 
water management so complex: policymakers must strike a careful balance in expanding 
service coverage without undermining the overall sustainability of the system. Raising 
water tariffs to meet cost recovery objectives will have a direct impact on low-income 
groups, engaging the issue of water affordability. In this scenario, the poor are often left 
to seek alternative means of water access, which are usually become unreliable and of 
poor quality. Water underpricing, on the other hand, poses several problems in ensuring 
water access, despite the promises of affordability. Lower utility charges increase water 
demand and, in some cases, may even encourage wasteful usage. Moreover, the 
infrastructure system as a whole becomes underfinanced, often leading to leakage and an 
incapacity for future expansion. These system inefficiencies may undercut efforts to 
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make water more accessible for the poor. In this respect, water policy must adopt a 
dynamic approach to reconcile expansion mandates with infrastructure viability.    
 The Aguas del Illimani agreement became internationally heralded for its “pro-
poor” features to promote water access. The contract specified system expansion 
mandates (measured by the number of in-house connections), a feature which became 
particularly salient for the underserved peri-urban areas. Despite the initial optimism, the 
La Paz water privatization resulted with coverage obligations unmet, leading to the 
eventual cancellation of the concession agreement. Here, the concessionaire determined 
that low density areas offered little cost recovery potential and, therefore, expansion 
projects excluded such neighborhoods accordingly. These excluded areas, on the outskirts 
of the city, often have higher rates of poverty with limited water access; undermining the 
“pro-poor” optimism of the concession agreement. In addition, regarding those connected 
to the system, the government did not provide targeted transfers to make water affordable 
for the poor. In this sense, the oriented tariff structure –oriented towards cost recovery 
objectives– was highly regressive. The combination of these factors led to public 
dissatisfaction toward the concessionaire, and perceived sense of its failure. This begs the 
question of whether this agreement “planted the seeds of its own failure” per se, and 
perhaps these expansion goals were too ambitious or unrealistic. In other words, was this 
failure a result of unforeseen risk or, instead, the result of a poorly designed agreement? 
With the benefit of hindsight, how could outcomes have turned out differently? These 
questions pertain to a larger debate on whether private sector involvement appropriately 
meets the challenges of water infrastructure reform. 
Maxwell  35 
 
 The events in Bolivia had a ripple-effect on the international scale, as they 
challenged the conventional wisdom of privatization reforms. At center stage of this 
debate is the World Bank, and its post-Washington Consensus doctrine. This “consensus” 
was introduced in the early 1990s to define a coherent set of goals for Latin American 
reform (Williamson, 1990). These included ten central propositions, including fiscal 
discipline, liberalization and deregulation to name a few. At its core, the consensus made 
poverty reduction a priority for policymaking. Reforms for privatization would also be an 
important component to the Williamsonian model of macroeconomic adjustment. In a 
retrospective review of the original intent of the consensus, Williamson (2000, 258) 
remarks that “the impact of privatization depends very much on how is done” – and the 
case of La Paz provides a case in point. Moreover, critics of the consensus would point 
out the objectives are too narrow, and ends were confused with means. What has emerged 
is a growing acceptance that “countries should be given room to experiment, use their 
own judgment, and to explore what might work best for them” (Stiglitz 2008, 54). This 
proposition is particularly evident in the Bolivian experience, as the external push for 
natural resource privatization brought a reemergence of nationalism.   
 The record of water privatization in Latin America is quite mixed. The region’s 
crises of the 1980s, marked with high inflation and debt, led governments to pursue 
liberalization programs to reform various sectors of the economy (Lora 2001; Teichman 
2001). These reforms fundamentally shifted the relationship between citizens and the 
state, as Baer (2008, 199) notes: 
The implementation of privatization of services in Latin America is 
attributed to a mixture of state inefficiency, changing norms about the role 
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of the state in the economy, the lack of resources in some countries, and 
the acceptance of the market as an appropriate venue for providing 
services to citizens. 
By 1988, Chile became the first to embrace private sector participation (PSP) in water; 
followed by Argentina and Mexico in 1991; and Peru, Columbia and Bolivia in the mid-
1990s. Along with PSP initiatives, reforms in most countries decentralized water 
governance to fragmented municipal-level entities. It is important to note that these 
reforms were not exclusively motivated by problems within the water sector, but the 
state’s macroeconomic structure as a whole. 
 The incorporation of PSP into water sector reflected a common dissatisfaction 
with national-level provision of water resources at the time. As Foster (2005, 1) suggests, 
this trend was a departure from the dysfunctional “clientilist” model of management, 
where “state-owned companies were often being treated as part of the political apparatus 
than allowed to function as service providers.” In this arrangement, water companies 
secure political patronage through various means – such as artificially low tariffs and 
overemployment. As a result, state-owned water companies have been subject to higher 
costs, administrative inefficiencies and a lower quality of service. Turning towards the 
private sector, or a strongly decentralized model of public management, has been sought 
as a remedy for such political interference. Despite these conceptual arguments, the 
impact of the PSP has been widely contested. Several authors point out that system 
improvements  following the PSP transition were consistent with previous trends – and 
therefore these improvements may not be directly attributed to PSP per se (Clarke, Kosec 
and Wallsten 2004; Leipziger 2004). Nevertheless, both of these authors conclude that  
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privatization had “no major adverse impacts on poverty and inequality.”1 In their panel of 
Latin American countries, Andrés et al (2008) find similar, but more encouraging results: 
output and coverage rates improved with previous trends, yet strong evidence supports 
greater efficiency (measured in distributional losses) after privatization.
 2
 In the face of 
these empirical trends, the public perception of privatization remains poor. In 2002, a 
survey of Latin American countries found that 61 percent of respondents “disagreed with 
the statement that privatizations have benefited to the country” (Barrera-Osorio and 
Olivera 2007, 4).
3
     
 Liberalizing, or the so-called “modernizing,” of the water sector may take many 
different forms, with varying mix between public and private. For the purposes of 
terminology, PSP implies a publicly-financed system with some degree of private 
contracting, lease, or operation. Privatization, on the other hand, will refer to a long-term 
(usually for 20 to 30 years) concession agreement which is both privately financed and 
operated.  The Bolivian experience reflects the general privatization model, where the 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The Private-Sector Led "Pro-Poor" Approach 
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government would become the regulator rather than the service provider. The BOT 
option, build-operate and -transfer, has widely been used in other countries across the 
region; however, most of these schemes have been used for small projects, such as 
treatment plants – not the system as a whole.4 Regardless of the institutional option, 
whether public or private, water infrastructure is, for the most part, considered a natural. 
By its very nature, which involves economies of scale, an organizational 
monopoly is considered as the most efficient structure. For small and medium size cities, 
Table 2: Institutional Options for Water Management 
 
Option Ownership Financing Operations 
    
Service contract Public Public Both 
 
Management contract Public Public Private 
 
Lease contract Public Public Private 
 
Concession Public Private Private 
 
BOT (build-operate-
transfer) contract 
Private then public Private Private 
 
 
BOOT (build-own-operate-
transfer) contact 
 
Private then public Private Private 
Reverse BOOT Public then private Public Private 
 
Joint ownership Both Both 
 
Both 
Sale Private Private Private 
 
Adapted from Kessides, 2004 
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single vertically integrated utilities usually serve as the preferred structure. Large cities 
may elect to use separate distribution networks, such as the case with Metro Manila, 
which holds two concessions. In consideration of these natural monopoly conditions, 
competition throughout the bidding process is considered as a key determinant in 
successful PSP implementation. In practically every case, the tariff structure would be 
negotiated with the regulatory body.  
 Much attention has been toward the Buenos Aires water privatization of 1992, as 
it became the first large-scale concession in the region. More importantly, this experience 
reveals the opportunities and constraints in bringing pro-poor infrastructure reform. The 
contract was awarded to the Aguas Argentinas consortium, through a competitive bidding 
process on the basis of tariff reduction. At the time of the transfer, 6.4 million residents 
were connected to the system, and approximately 200,000 of these connections were in 
informal neighborhoods.
5
 In the outer edge of city, 48 percent of the population had no 
access to piped water – posing a mandate for coverage expansion. 6  The concession 
contract required one million inhabitants to be added to the system every five years, for 
the first 15 years. By the end of the 30-year concession period, Aguas Argentinas would 
need to achieve 100 percent water service coverage.
7
 Nevertheless, high connection fees 
posed an obstacle in achieving coverage goals in low income areas. This brought several 
renegotiations with the regulator, in 1994 and 1998, to introduce a universal charge for all 
of its existing customers to cross-subsidize new connections. In addition, Aguas 
Argentinas created the Low-Income Settlements Program to promote a horizontally 
integrated structure of water management within informal neighborhoods. This program 
was in recognition that expansion targets may better met with the involvement of local 
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actors and nongovernmental organizations.  This decentralized approach, proactively led 
by Aguas Argentinas, has widely been regarded as a successful program in bringing 
investments to low-income areas.
8
 Nevertheless, political opposition against privatization 
in Buenos Aires led to the exit of Aguas Argentinas in 2006. 
 In an evaluation of the Bank’s experience in Bolivia, the report concludes that 
“Privatization is not a panacea […] Privatization does not insulate a utility from the 
consequences of poor project selection, political interference, weak management or lack 
of community support.”9 The Bolivian experience offers valuable insight to this point, as 
three major cities experimented with different models of water resource provision. As 
extensively elaborated, Cochabamba’s privatization met fierce backlash as a result of 
soaring tariff rates and a disregard for “usos y costumbres” customary user rights. The 
southern city of Santa Cruz, on the other hand, provides a cooperative model which has 
earned “the reputation as one of the best-managed utilities in Latin America.”10 Over the 
period of 1988-1999, water connections increased from 70 percent to 94 percent of 
households in Santa Cruz – juxtaposed to the Cochabamba debacle, where water 
connections fell from 70 percent to 60 percent.
11
 This case shows that cooperatives may 
be a viable alternative to either public or private approaches. Moreover, mixed 
experiences such these have revitalized the debate on privatization, where some of the 
Bank’s initial proponents of privatization now express caution about its sociopolitical 
implications (Nellis, 2012). 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the La Paz case met similar challenges in 
promoting water coverage for the peri-urban poor. Unforeseen conditions would bring a 
series of renegotiations between the concessionaire and the regulator. In both the cases of 
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La Paz and Buenos Aires, tariffs had to be adjusted and expansion targets were 
eventually loosened – all which undermine initial commitments to expand coverage. 
Here, we reach the underlying question motivating this thesis: how could pro-poor 
infrastructure reform be sustained for the long term? In other words, what conditions are 
necessary to encourage utility companies (public or private) to expand water access for 
the peri-urban poor? This question is imperative, as Kessides (2004, 256) notes, “the 
political economy of water has not been highly in favor to reform, which partly explains 
why the water sector is behind electricity, telecommunications, and transportation […].” 
Furthermore, Shirley and Ménard (2002, 8) reaffirm this notion, indicating that “water 
reform has high social benefits but low political benefits, especially when compared with 
reform in other utilities.” Given these obstacles, the policy framework must be reoriented 
to match high social benefits with high political benefits within the water sector. 
 In designing these pro-poor strategies, several key questions must be considered. 
Hardoy and Schusterman (2000) propose a framework for prioritizing investments within 
low-income neighborhoods, illustrated as a tradeoff between two factors: resource need 
and service feasibility. Intuitively speaking, areas that are high in need but lack feasibility 
are most likely to become underinvested. Determining areas of need may simply be 
determined by rates of poverty or service coverage. The question of feasibility, however, 
opens a bundle of considerations with many separate dimensions. Here, feasibility may 
be determined by the utility company’s predicted marginal returns in expanding water 
services to low-income areas. Without regulatory mandates or a form of subsidy, there 
may be little economic incentive to meet the needs of the urban poor. 
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Water as a Social and Economic Good 
 In context of El Alto, where water is considerably scarce, the viability of the 
resource may fall to the familiar “tragedy of the commons.” Hardin, illustrating an 
overgrazed herding pasture, develops the tragedy: “Ruin is the destination toward all men 
rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in freedom of the 
commons” (Ostrom, 1990, 2). The rational herder, in this illustration, benefits from an 
open pasture, yet suffers the delayed costs of deterioration (“the free-rider problem”). 
Ostrom (2005) provides a conceptual framework for separate types of economic goods 
based on rivalry and excludability: private or market goods, toll or club goods, fully 
public goods, and common pool resources. Water is naturally a common pool resource – 
as river or lake cannot be practically partitioned into distinguishable plots in order to 
become a private good. The closed system of urban water infrastructure inherently turns 
water into a toll good, where inclusion relies on service connectivity. In addition, 
Table 3: The Conceptual Framework of Economic Goods 
   
Rivalry in consumption 
  Yes No 
Excludability of 
benefits 
Yes Private or market goods Toll or club goods 
No Common pool resources Fully public goods 
 
 Source: Ostrom, 2005
12
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excludability is also determined by water tariff structures, as a household’s consumption 
of water is directly linked by the household’s ability to pay. Excludability may balance 
the ecological realities of the system (water supply and demand), therefore ensuring long-
term viability. To a certain extent, making water a “toll good” mitigates the “tragedy” of 
common pool resource extraction. Nevertheless, the policymaking process determining 
who is excluded is a very precarious and socially sensitive issue. Access to water is 
undeniably a basic human need, as “water gives life to everything, including human 
development and human freedom” (UNDP, 2006). If there is a normative acceptance of 
the human right to water, the approach toward water resources must be more 
comprehensive, rather than a simplification as an economic good.  
 
Pricing 
 Price structuring is perhaps the most fundamental feature of any utility system. In 
water infrastructure, pricing influences the resource distribution among users and 
determines the rate of cost recovery. The affordability of water has a direct relationship 
with water security for low income groups. These implications place both efficiency and 
equity considerations to water pricing reform. From the efficiency-oriented perspective, 
tariffs affect the resource supply and demand, where costs on the consumer may promote 
efficient water usage.
13
 Pricing also has an equity effect, as it may accommodate 
equitable resource distribution to meet the needs of underserved groups. The question of 
equitable water policies becomes even more salient in the development context, such as 
the case in La Paz. Tariffs play a key role in when it comes to service expansion to low-
income areas, as Komives (1999, 20) notes: 
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Tariffs and concession fees affect outcomes in low-income neighborhoods 
in three very basic ways: by affecting the cost recovery potential of the 
concession, by shaping the concessionaire’s marginal incentive to serve 
certain customers over others, and by affecting demand for the 
concessionaire’s services. 
With these considerations, policy decisions on water pricing must carefully strike the 
balance between system sustainability and distributional equity. 
 For the utility provider, the underlying objective of a water tariff is to provide a 
revenue base. With public companies, there is a wide acceptance that revenues should 
cover system costs – as shortfalls would have to be made up some other way, usually 
though general tax revenue. In addition, profits imply that consumers are overpaying for 
the service, which is understood to be inappropriate for a public enterprise. When 
discussing private sector options, a normal profit is usually predetermined, using the 
“yardstick” approach: where private companies are expected to deliver water at a similar 
quality and price compared to selected cities with favorable outcomes (Shleifer 1985). 
The private company, under these conditions, may seek to maximize its profit through 
increased efficiency (minimized system leakage, reduced worker per connection ratio) – 
without compromising the “yardstick” expectations of water affordability and quality. 
 Regulators may employ several forms of pricing structures in order to achieve the 
policy goals just discussed. There are two basic structures for water tariffs: single-part 
tariffs and a two part tariff. Under the single-part tariff design, the water bill is based 
either on a fixed charge or a consumption-based charge. The advantage of choosing a 
fixed charge would be its simplicity: in many developing urban areas, non-metered usage 
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remains an issue, especially in cases where multiple households share one connection 
(Whittington, 1992; Cheng, 2013). This universal charge may be an optimal choice where 
water is abundant. In more arid environments, however, efficiency of water use becomes 
a larger concern. Block tariffs and linear tariffs, where prices are volumetrically 
determined, have been embraced to ensure distributional efficiency. Table 4 illustrates 
the block tariff used by Aguas del Illimani in La Paz, beginning in 1997. Under this 
structure, the price in the most expensive block is almost five times higher than the initial 
block. 
 The two-part tariff may offer a more conservationist alternative, in terms of water 
use, as it merges fixed pricing with consumption-based pricing. In theory, the fixed 
component of the tariff should cover the operation and maintenance (O&M) costs of the 
system – such as costs incurred through management, labor, repair materials and water 
treatment (Rogers, Bhatia and Huber, 1998).
14
 Fixed prices should follow the cost-based 
pricing rule (or average-cost pricing): where prices are set with cost recovery in mind. 
The second component of the tariff would be consumption-based, with a volumetric 
Table 4: Increasing Block Structure of Aguas del Illimani 
 
Volumetric charge  
(US$ per m
3
) 
Domestic water 
connections (m
3
) 
Commercial water 
connections (m
3
) 
Industrial water 
connections (m
3
) 
0.22 1 to 30 
 
 
 
0.44 31 to 150 
 
 
 
0.66 151 to 300 1 to 20 
 
 
1.19 301 an above 21 and above 1 and above 
 
Adapted from Boland and Whittington, 2000 
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determination of costs. Increasing block tariffs (IBTs) have become the pricing method of 
choice in most developing countries.
15
 Here, the opportunity cost of water is considered: 
one’s usage of a given unit water deprives another customer of that same unit of water. 
With water prices reflecting the level of consumption, the IBTs introduce demand 
elasticity among water users. Nevertheless, there remains a certain extent of inelasticity, 
as there is a minimum requirement of water consumption to meet the basic demands of a 
household. The World Health Organization determines that the minimum amount of 
water to sustain human life and health is 25 liters per capita per day. Most countries have 
subsidies that exceed far above this level, as “lifeline” tariffs are set to 30 cubic meters a 
month per connection (that roughly amounts to 200 liters per capita per day).
16
  
 Although the IBT option has been a widely accepted form of water pricing, 
Boland and Whittington (2000) caution against the possible adverse effects the block 
structure. From the onset, there is the difficulty of determining the household demand to 
raise cost recovery revenues – as the block system requires careful method of price 
discrimination. In addition, informal neighborhoods typically have connections serving 
multiple households, which would raise these households to a more expensive block of 
water. This scenario would be highly regressive, as the poor would essentially be paying 
more than the rich for the same volume of water.   
  
Subsidies 
 Policies promoting universal coverage may require some form of subsidy to make 
water affordable to the poor. There are multiple policy choices pertaining to subsidies: 
from guarantees of free minimum service to direct transfers. In most cases, the block 
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tariff structure is used as a cross-subsidy, where higher levels of consumers subsidize the 
prices for lower levels. There are also various other forms of cross-subsidization; in the 
Buenos Aires case, where a universal fixed surcharge across water users subsidized new 
connection fees. With the Cochabamba privatization, price discrimination was made on a 
geographical basis, as tariffs were determined according to the neighborhood. The 
application of subsidies in water management makes the resource an effective 
redistributive mechanism, and if done correctly, it may largely improve the lives of the 
poor. By spending less on water, low-income households may be able to use the cash for 
other needs. Water affordability will also carry positive externalities, especially in the 
scope of sanitation (Komives et al., 2005). 
 Targeted cash transfers for low-income groups have been widely considered as 
the most efficient form of subsidy. The cash transfer approach allows the recipient to 
have flexibility, positing that autonomy in spending choices is the most effective means 
of poverty alleviation. It is also understood that a targeted program maximizes the 
benefits for those in most of need – as long as the methods of targeting are appropriate 
(Grosh et al 2008). In practice, this transfer usually requires a standard benchmark 
parameter to determine program enrollment. Chile, for example, enacted a benchmark set 
by the Pan American Health Organization, which determined that water bills should not 
exceed more than five percent of household income. Despite this program’s success, it 
has not been widely replicated by other countries (Gómez-Lobo, Andrés and Foster, 
2000).  
 Most tariff structures, however, use a cross-subsidy within the IBT pricing 
method. This may be preferable for countries with low administrative capacity, where 
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direct transfers cannot be facilitated. Under the block tariff, consumers in the more 
expensive block partially offset the water price for consumers in the less expensive 
blocks. In essence, this subsidy has a self-selecting targeting mechanism, as low-income 
households typically use less water, with steeper demand elasticity. Nevertheless, there 
remains a danger of mismatch between high-level consumers and those at the lower 
levels. This cross-subsidy is also vulnerable to several adverse effects, as elaborated by 
Boland and Whittington (2000). In low-income neighborhoods, multiple household units 
often share one single metered connection point, where cumulative consumption may 
place these consumers in the more expensive blocks.   
 
Regulation and Oversight 
 The success or failure of policy goals may be largely determined by the regulatory 
environment. The regulator has the challenge to “meet both efficiency and social welfare 
objectives in the water sector, balancing the needs of operators, consumers, governments 
and the environment” (Kessides, 2004, 219). Regulatory authorities provide public 
custodianship over the water resource, primarily by setting the price of water. These 
agencies also have the mandate to oversee the utility company’s operations and its 
progress towards target service goals (system coverage, quality, reliability). There are 
several inherent features which separate the water sector from other utilities; all which 
have political and economic implications for regulatory regimes (refer to Table 5). To 
begin with, water is not a homogeneous product when quality comes into consideration. 
This implies that the regulator must hold the service provider accountable to certain 
quality standards, given the health externalities associated with poor water quality. In 
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addition, water has high transport costs on the regional scale, unlike electricity 
transmission on large national grid.
17
 With these costs in mind, water infrastructure tends 
to be characterized as geographically fragmented systems, often operating under  
municipal jurisdiction (Foster, 1996). 
 The economies of scale involved in water infrastructure make the system, for the 
most part, a natural monopoly.
19
 This brings a strong political motivation to enforce a 
regulatory structure for the utility, especially provided that water is a basic necessity. 
While most of the literature has been focused on private sector regulation, public utilities 
also require extensive oversight to ensure efficiency:  
Government ownership of water systems is no substitute for regulation 
because public monopolies also have incentives to overcharge consumers 
with no alternative supply, and to run down the capital stock and 
underinvest. (Kessides, 227) 
Considering this natural monopoly issue, the policy literature has recently emphasized 
Table 5: Special Features of the Water Sector 
 
Issue Economic Dimension Political Dimension 
Horizontal Structure Fragmented Networks Municipal Control 
Responsibility for 
Provision 
Limited Scope for Competition Desire to Retain Public Sector 
Control 
Social Policy Health and Environment 
Externalities 
Strong Ideological Character 
 
Adapted from Foster, 1996
18
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price caps as an effective regulatory instrument. Noll, Shirley and Cowan (2000, 15) 
describe that utility operators possess more information than regulators, “and if regulators 
base prices on indicators that a firm controls, firms can increase their profits by distorting 
the performance indicator.” In this case, the operator may use information asymmetry to 
achieve higher profits without maximizing system efficiency. By implementing price 
caps on water, the regulator may avoid the expensive task of determining the average-
cost price.  
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Notes 
 
1
 Quoted from Leipziger 2004, slide 2. Clarke et al 2004 maintains the same conclusion, 
finding that “connection rates for the poorest households also tended to increase in the 
regions with PSP and in the control regions, suggesting that – in terms of connections at 
least – PSP did not harm the poor.”  
2
 For their analysis, the authors sample Argentina, Columbia, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago.   
3
 Referencing the Latinobarómetro survey (2002): <http://www.latinobarometro.org> 
4
 Lobina and Hall, 2008, 86. 
5
 Hardoy and Schusterman, 2000, 64. 
6
 Hardoy and Schusterman, (2000, 64) cite a 1994 UNICEF report. 
7
 Plummer, 2002, 21.  
8
  Abdala, 1996; Hardoy and Schusterman, 2000 
9
  World Bank, 2002, 3. 
10
 World Bank, 2002, 2. 
11
 World Bank, 2006, 53. 
12
 Ostrom, 2005, 24. 
13
 Under the assumption of a volume-based pricing method 
14
 Refer to Figure 1, “General Principles for Cost of Water,” Rogers, Bhatia and Huber 
(1998, 7). 
15
 Boland and Whittington, 2000, 215 
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16
 This amount is roughly 200 liters per capita per day for a household of five members: 
Boland and Whittington, 2000.  
17
 To illustrate these high costs of regional water transfers, refer to the Melamchi Water 
Supply Project in Kathmandu (Maxwell, 2012). 
18
 Table 4 in Foster (1996, 7). 
19
 Noll, Shirley, and Cowan (2000) mention that water infrastructure does not inherently 
need to be a monopoly, at least from the supply-side. Bulk water may be sold into the 
delivery system through a decentralized system of reservoirs. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four 
 The Government of Bolivia has been taking recent steps to re-examine the water 
sector in La Paz and El Alto: most notably with the creation of a master plan for 2013-
2036 (“Plan Maestro Metropolitano de Agua Potable y Saneamiento La Paz – El Alto,” 
or simply, “PMM”). The master plan, produced by the Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y 
Agua (MMAyA), seeks to identify strategies for expansion of water coverage, with plans 
to incorporate satellite municipalities as far as Pucapani, Palca, and Mecapaca. The 
forthcoming Plan is a milestone in the region’s water infrastructure development, as the 
most recent master plan dates back to 1994. Within the scope of institutional 
arrangements, the Plan proposes several models to reform the existing pubic provider, 
EPSAS.
1
 The document states that the Government of Bolivia is pursuing a “vigorous 
process” of incorporating social sectors in the delivery of water services: 
En el sector de agua y saneamiento, el Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia 
está viviendo un proceso muy vigoroso de incorporación de los sectores 
sociales en el diseño de políticas públicas, en procesos de planificación, de 
regulación, como en los procesos de gestión institucional y/o de 
fortalecimiento en la prestación de servicios de agua potable y 
alcantarillado sanitario. (MMAyA, 2013)
2
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From the onset, several fundamental issues are identified with the existing state of water 
management: (1) the national water law is outdated, and contradicts the new constitution; 
(2) there is insufficient regulation of the public providers, with limited mechanisms for 
verification and intervention of the regulator; (3) limited administrative and technical 
capacity among the public providers; and (4) problems of inefficiency with water use, 
particularly the issue of non-metered usage. 
 By December 2006, after the contract with Aguas del Illimani was formally 
terminated, water services were almost immediately transferred to EPSAS.  The new 
public provider was created under Decreto 28933, with over US$9 million in bonds 
through the Fondo Nacional de Desarollo Regional (FNDR).
3
 The legal framework 
allowing the transfer was defined under the Ley del Sistema de Regulación Sectorial 
(SIRESE) – a law which developed the regulatory environment for various sectors. This 
piece of legislation would be later replaced by Decreto Supremo No 0071, establishing 
the Autoridad de Fiscalización y Control Social de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico 
(AAPS) to regulate the water sector.
4
 This would come to replace the Superintendencia 
de Aguas, which regulated the sector throughout the years of privatization. At the time of 
the transfer, EPSAS was only intended to temporarily operate the utility – with a six 
month deadline for a new “social and public company.”  This deadline had been extended 
on a reoccurring basis, every six months, with expectations for reform. Nevertheless, the 
hopes of a new company never materialized, leaving the short-term minded EPSAS as the 
de facto long-term service provider. 
To this day, six years after its creation, EPSAS finds itself in an incredibly 
precarious state: marked with poor management and an inability to fulfill contractual 
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obligations. In an unprecedented move, the regulator took complete control of the EPSAS 
in April 2013.
5
 The intervention allows AAPS to assume all of operations and 
management responsibilities for a period of six months – and by the end of the 
intervention, the central government will introduce a reformed EPSAS. In a statement by 
AAPS, a perceived management crisis became the grounds for intervention: 
EPSAS tiene baja ejecución de inversiones, no tiene capacidad de 
reposición en inversión, su software de facturación corre riesgo de 
colapso, contamina el medio ambiente […] no tiene gestión de riesgos e 
incumple sus compromisos con el pueblo.
6
 
In consideration of these points, from poor risk management to environmental 
degradation, there is a clear consensus that EPSAS is in a failed state. This places the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, more particularly the Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y 
Agua, at a crossroads on water governance reform. The key question is how to create a 
more accountable and efficient public service provider, at a time of management crisis.  
 
An Interlocking Legal Framework 
 At the national level, the constitution introduces the underpinning policy 
framework that governs water. The MAS government brought a new agenda on natural 
resource policy, directly following the election of Evo Morales. The constitution of 2009 
affirms the human right for water and the responsibly of the state for the promotion of 
water access: 
El agua constituye un derecho fundamentalísimo para la vida, en el marco 
de la soberanía del pueblo. El Estado promoverá el uso y acceso al agua 
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sobre la base de principios de solidaridad, complementariedad, 
reciprocidad, equidad, diversidad y sustentabilidad.  
(Artículo 373, I)
7
 
In addition to this agenda on natural resource policy, the constitution explicitly 
recognizes more traditional systems of water governance. Such features may be 
particularly salient in the context of El Alto, where 74 percent of its residents self-
identify as Aymara.
8
 To elaborate on “usos y costumbres” rights, there is a clause which 
legitimizes customary practices in water resource policy, stating:  
El Estado reconocerá, respectará y protegerá los usos y costumbres de las 
comunidades, de sus autoridades locales y de las organizaciones indígena 
origina campesinas sobre el derecho, el manejo y la gestión sustentable del 
agua. 
(Artículo 374, II)
9
 
This recognition of customary practice aligns with the MAS government’s embrace of 
plurinationalism, through its intent to incorporate indigenous forms of governance with 
mainstream decision making (Perreault, 2008). It must be understood, however, that the 
right to “usos y costumbres” is not exclusive to indigenous communities, and may be 
invoked by any local group. Therefore, there is a certain degree of selectivity, on the part 
of the national government, in determining which local institutions merit autonomy in 
water provision.  
 These constitutional clauses, introduced through the referendum of 2009, have 
certainly set a normative tone at the national level. Nevertheless, its ambiguity has 
policymakers at a crossroads on the actualization of these rights. In other words, what 
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form of legal framework would appropriately promote “usos y costumbres” rights, and a 
participatory decision making process? Furthermore, how will separate groupings of 
water users be prioritized in the water management process? These policy aims are far 
from being reached, as the national water law dates to 1906.
10
 While the “Ley de Aguas 
Vigente” stands as the most current law, it is unfit, and certainly irrelevant, for the 
policymaking environment of today. In fact, the law directly contradicts the constitution 
by allowing private domain over water, if it naturally sources within private land.
11
 
Moreover, the 1906 law does not delegate arbitration power to any current body of 
government to mediate conflict. This is particularly important in the context of rapid 
urbanization, with domestic and commercial users often demanding water transfers from 
the agricultural sector. For the time being, most urban-rural water conflicts remain 
unresolved; a legal imperative that has profound implications for meeting the growing 
demands of La Paz and El Alto. There is a general notion among farmers in the region 
that their bargaining power is weak in the face of the much larger EPSAS.  
 Since 2012, a proposed water law has been in a process of deliberation within the 
national legislature. The proposed framework, titled “Ley Marco Agua Para la Vida,” 
was brought forth by MMAyA in response to the renewed constitutional mandates on 
water rights. Here, priority is given to water for human consumption, with a proposed 
“Autoridad Plurinational del Agua” to integrate water users (Capítulo III). Although this 
document was developed with 119 civil society organizations, there has been widespread 
public skepticism regarding its top-down approach toward integrated water resource 
management. Some critics caution that the law would further facilitate megaprojects by 
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overriding local opposition.
12
 These debates have stalled the legislative process, at a time 
when a general water law is far overdue.      
 Turning towards potable water services exclusively, several national laws affirm 
that water should be delivered at the municipal level. The primary legal framework of the 
sector is included in “Ley No 2066 de Servicio de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado 
Sanitario,” which establishes the institutional norms of EPSAS (the provider) and the 
regulatory Superintendencia (currently replaced by MMAyA). The law was introduced in 
year 2000, to accommodate the privatizations in La Paz and Cochabamba with a robust 
regulatory structure. Provided the current political environment, with nationalized water 
services, the law is somewhat outdated: especially since it permits private water 
concessions. Nevertheless, Artículo 13 delegates many aspects of water provision to the 
municipal government, such as planning and the determination of coverage goals. Water 
governance at the municipal-level is also reinforced by the more recent decentralization 
law, “Ley No 031 de ‘Andrés Ibáñez’” of 2010.13  Under this law, the municipality has 
the responsibility to execute and finance water infrastructure projects, alongside of the 
State and departmental governments (Artículo 83). The extent of municipal involvement, 
however, will rely on its financial resources, institutional capacity, and political will.  
 
The Urgency for Reform 
 These legal shortcomings have left Bolivian urban water management in a broken 
state. More specifically, the constitutional mandate to promote a decentralized approach 
towards natural resource policy has not been put to practice. The water system in La Paz 
would be no exception, as it has been administered by the national EPSAS provider, 
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despite promises to devolve autonomous power to the municipal governments. The 
intervention of the regulator in April, 2013 certainly reflects the widespread frustration 
over EPSAS. In a statement provided by AAPS, released several weeks before it seized 
control of the utility’s operations, the regulator argues that EPSAS is essentially 
unconstitutional:  
Que, a pesar del citado mandato constitucional y a 3 (tres) años de la 
promulgación de la Constitución Política del Estado […] EPSAS SA. no 
se adecuo a los modelos de gestión señalados en la citada Carta Magna. 
(AAPS, 2013, 8)
14
 
Here, the regulator asserts that the public company has illegitimately remained in 
operation, with the intent of providing justification for intervention. The statement even 
suggests that the model of EPSAS intrinsically contradicts the constitution, as the entity 
does not meet the requirements of a “Sociedad Anónima,” as prescribed by the Código de 
Comercio (Arículo 125). It recognizes that EPSAS is an ad hoc entity formed to 
temporarily replace Aguas del Illimani throughout the 2005 nationalization. Yet its 
continued existence today, as AAPS would argue, undermines the country’s renewed 
constitutional mandates on natural resource policy.  
 To further the case for intervention, AAPS provides a list which reflects the 
dysfunctional state of the public provider. The points made here offer a compelling 
argument in support of sweeping reforms across the La Paz-El Alto water sector. First, 
there are concerns over the production of water and system expansion. In 2011 alone, 
EPSAS had reduced water production by 69 million cubic meters, despite a revenue 
increase of $21 million. As a result, the provider generated an unjustified surplus of $110 
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million, but only invested $40 million for system improvements. This low investment rate 
is especially concerning given the need for expansion, as elaborated in the earlier 
chapters. The document also points that EPSAS has not presented a single study or 
project which considers infrastructure expansion (AAPS, 2013, 9).  
 The regulator also blames EPSAS for high rates of system leakage, which has 
resulted in an estimated $19 million annual loss. This unaccounted water loss may also 
reflect a high incidence of nonpayment or non-metered usage.  Turning towards the 
administrative functions of EPSAS, the regulator finds that the information technology is 
insufficient for billing purposes, which in part explains the reduction of billable revenue.  
Moreover, here is a concern for the general management of the staff, including the 
inactivity of Board members. 
 Throughout the period of 2007 to 2011, the Plurinational State of Bolivia has 
partnered with international institutions (mainly IDB and CAF) and cooperative agencies 
to invest $91.2 million for infrastructure improvements in the La Paz-El Alto water 
system. Despite this level of investment, EPSAS yet finds itself in a fragile administrative 
and financial state, in urgent need of reform. In the regulator’s statement, there is a clear 
frustration over the current situation:  
Que, la deficiente gestión en la administración de la empresa no solo pone 
en serio riesgo la prestación del servicio, sino que compromete recursos 
económicos del Estado Plurinational de Bolivia, que “nacionalizo” las 
acciones de la Empresa Aguas del Illimani SA., tomo el control de la 
Empresa, no para administrarla de forma ineficiente, o entregar su 
administración a grupos de poder sociales, políticos, sindicales o 
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económicos, asumió el control de la Empresa, para adecuarla a los 
mandatos y principios de la Constitución Política del Estado, para 
concretizar los derechos fundamentales en ella consagrados, al efecto el 
Estado a través de la instancias llamadas por Ley, debe retomar y ejercer 
su función de fiscalización y control, sobre la citada Empresa, que a la 
fecha cuenta con un Directorio renunciante, una Gerencia General 
designada de forma anómala y una gestión inoperante e ineficiente.  
(AAPS, 2013, 13)
15
 
The regulator assertively remarks that the mismanagement of EPSAS not only places risk 
on the infrastructure itself, but puts financial risk on the central government. In addition, 
the nationalized company has not been able to fulfill the mandates of the constitution, 
with respect to fundamental human rights. These claims shed light on the political 
impetus for reform: as the reform has implications that reach farther than the 
infrastructure system itself, but rather the process of (pluri) nation-building under the 
Morales government. In other words, the failure of EPSAS in meeting constitutional 
mandates of 2009 may undermine the political transition brought by MAS. In light of the 
new constitution, “inspired” by the contention over natural resources in the past decade, 
ensuring water accessibility has been a political imperative. This, in part, may account the 
urgency of reform that has been imposed by the national government.  
 With the benefit of hindsight, it is important to consider the possible conditioning 
factors leading to the poor performance of EPSAS. Recall that the company was brought 
in to swiftly replace the private provider, after Aguas del Illimani exited in 2007. The 
implementation of EPSAS, however, was understood to be a temporary provider (for a 
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limit of six months) until the municipalities could assume control over the infrastructure 
system. Therefore, the initial concept of EPSAS may describe its lack of farsightedness 
for obvious reasons. Under this arrangement, the public company had no mandates for 
service expansion, long-term investments, or improvements in efficiency. Given these 
inherent problems, perhaps it was the inaction of the regulator that may explain the 
provider’s unaccountability and mismanagement. The regulator’s intervention in April 
2013 was far overdue, given that EPSAS should have been replaced in 2007. In this 
sense, there were minimal checks and balances in place to hold the utility provider 
accountable. This reflects a broader concern of the regulatory system as a whole: AAPS 
reports that only 30 of the 672 registered water providers across Bolivia are actually 
being regulated.
16
 While this may speak to the limited capacity of AAPS, the outdated 
legal framework undermines the regulatory environment in the water sector. The current 
law, “Ley No 2066,” was introduced in 2000 to regulate privatized water infrastructure 
systems, not large-scale public systems.  
 Although the intervention has been imposed by the national government, AAPS 
acknowledges that it does not have the constitutional mandate to establish a local water 
provider.
17
 Instead, this new entity would have to be developed and adopted by the 
municipal governments. This leaves AAPS and the executive to assume only a facilitative 
role among various institutional actors, without a implementing a new water company 
from the top down. The Plan Maestro 2013-2036, spearheaded by MMAyA, 
demonstrates this role by offering extensive technical support and policy 
recommendations to local governments and the public. International technical  
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consultants, including GITEC Consult and the TYPSA Group, were involved in drafting 
these plans. Local expertise has come from NGOs, namely Land and Water Bolivia. 
Aside from the financial and environmental analysis provided here, the master plan offers 
three potential models of institutional reform. These proposals have been considered in 
public fora, involving various local actors, especially with the participation of FEJUVE 
and the Comité de Vigilancia.
18
 The municipality of La Paz has already endorsed one 
proposal, while El Alto has yet to offer a preference. Negotiation at the municipal level is 
imperative, and sufficient agreement on an institutional model would be an adequate first 
step. 
   
 
Table 6: Institutional Actors in the Water Sector 
Direct Actors  Entidad Prestadora de Servicios de Agua Potable y/o Alcantarillo 
Sanitario (EPSAS) 
Public Actors  Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Agua (MMAyA) 
 Servicio Nacional Para la Sostenibilidad de Saneamiento Básico 
(SENASBA) 
 Autoridad de Fiscalización y Control Social de Agua Potable y 
Saneamiento Básico (AAPS) 
 Gobiernos Autónomos Municipales (GMs, GAMs) 
 Gobiernos Autónomos Departamentales 
Social Actors  Federación de Juntas Vecinales (FEJUVEs) 
 Comités de Vigilancia 
Other Actors  NGOs and INGOs 
 Technical assistance from cooperative agencies  
 Universities and research institutes 
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Toward an Integrated Approach 
 The regulator justified the intervention on various grounds, from poor risk 
management to environmental degradation. Nevertheless, a broader and more 
fundamental issue is yet to be addressed: what form of governance would most 
effectively manage water delivery for the region? This requires that stakeholders set the 
balance between regulatory powers at the national level and autonomy at the local 
municipal level. There is also the question of integrating the municipalities in a 
consortium (or multiple consortia), for better water management. The restructuring of 
water governance in La Paz-El Alto must be determined during this intervention, as 
required by law. For this reason, the two municipalities –along with its satellite cities– 
stand at a critical juncture for the future of natural resource management. 
 From the onset, there are a number of considerations ought to be taken into 
account throughout the reform process. One of the primary features of the infrastructure 
system is its physical integration across the region. As described in Chapter One, the 
region is geographically divided between the expanding El Alto highlands, the lower La 
Paz valley, and the steep “ladera” slopes in between (under La Paz jurisdiction). Despite 
this distinct geographical fragmentation, its water infrastructure is highly integrated, with 
water resources conveniently transferred among subsystems. As Figure 6 shows, water 
generally flows from the El Alto systems, to the Laderas, then Achachicala and 
Pampahasi. Although water (sourcing from the neighboring Andean range) externally 
enters the system at various points, the lion’s share of water volume is captured by the El 
Alto subsystem before distribution across the region. With this in mind, the infrastructure   
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Figure 6: Water Flow Diagram of Subsystems within El Alto and La Paz  
Water source: 
Condoriri Tuni Hauyna Potosi Milluni Kaluyo Incachaca Hampaturi 
 
 
 
Author’s elaboration. 
 
Table 7: Subsystem Operating Costs and Revenues (2011) 
Achachicala Pampahasi Laderas El Alto Totals 
(a) Total Water Connections 
29,695 51,387 38,606 191,999 311,687 
10% 16% 12% 62%  
(b) System Operating Costs 
BOB 8,512,615 BOB 14,731,024 BOB 11,067,116 BOB 55,040,026 BOB 89,350,780 
10% 16% 12% 62%  
(c) Revenues from Tariffs* 
BOB 67,150,265 BOB 51,794,993 BOB 14,382,126 BOB 50,563,620 BOB 183,891,004 
37% 28% 8% 27%  
 
Adapted from MMAyA (2013). 
*42 percent of the total tariff revenues come from large commercial clients 
  
EL ALTO 
TILITA 
LADERAS 
ACHACHICA
PAMPAHASI 
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must be governed as an integrated system, therefore demanding cooperation between the 
local municipalities on water provision.  
 Another important feature may be found with the large imbalance of financing 
between the subsystems (refer to Table 7). The poorest and most populous sections, the 
Laderas and El Alto (combined), account for 74 percent of the total system’s operating 
costs, but only make up 35 percent of tariff-based revenues. This large gap in cost and 
revenue share is expected, given the socioeconomic differences when compared to the 
wealthier La Paz sections. Nevertheless, there are remarkable windfalls across most 
sections, of which the regulator finds as the surplus completely unjustified. In the 
Achachicala subsystem, for example, revenues exceed costs by an astonishing eightfold 
difference. Surpluses occur for the Laderas section, even though the area is considerably 
poorer than the southern sections. Therefore, both high- and low- income water users are 
overpaying for water services, with regard to the operating costs. This certainly 
undermines any progressive cross-subsidization objectives, which may attempt to make 
water more affordable to the poor.  
 The price structure of EPSAS is unique as it includes a targeted subsidy within an 
increasing block tariff (IBT). Here, users pay rates according to the volume of water 
consumed, where a certain extent of price elasticity would encourage less water usage 
(refer to Table 8). The targeted component comes with the “Tarifa Solidaria” program, 
reflecting the lowest water rate for qualifying households. Several indicators point to the 
poor design of this pricing structure. First, the threshold for the least expensive 
volumetric block is set at 15 cubic meters per month, which is excessively far above the 
conventional “lifeline” requirement of water. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the  
Maxwell  67 
 
 
World Health Organization has determined that the minimum amount of water needed for 
consumption and sanitation needs stands at 25 liters per capita per day. This converts to 
roughly four cubic meters per month, for a household of five people. Taking these 
figures, the volume threshold from the “Tarifa Solidaria” group to the “Low 
Consumption” group is set inappropriately high.  
 The large share of total water users qualifying for the Tarifa Solidaria implies 
very little progressivity with the price structure. Table 9 shows that with La Paz and El 
Alto combined, 76 percent of residential water users are enrolled in the “targeted” 
program, and thus are paying the lowest rate of the IBT. This offers overwhelming 
Table 8: Tariff Structure of EPSAS 
Consumption Price BOB/m
3
 Domestic (m
3
) Commercial (m
3
) Industrial (m
3
) 
High BOB 12.21 301- 21- 1 
Medium BOB 06.84 151 – 300 1-20  
Low BOB 04.56 31 – 150   
Domestic (2) BOB 02.28 1 – 15   
Domestic (1) BOB 01.82 1 – 15   
“Tarifa Solidaria” BOB 01.78 1 – 15   
Reproduced from AAPS
19
 
 
Table 9: Water Users Enrolled for "Tarifa Solidaria" (2011) 
 La Paz El Alto Totals 
Total households with “Tarifa Solidaria” 66,015 166,124 232,139 
Share among all water users 56% 88% 76% 
Adapted from Gobierno Municipal de La Paz (2013) 
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evidence that benefits are not being actualized by the “poorest of the poor” in society, 
nonetheless the bottom half. Policymakers interested in promoting water access must 
reconsider the qualifying criteria to make targeting more effective. Otherwise, the 
magnitude of the program suggests that the Tarifa Solidaria is heavily politicized. 
 
Institutional Models for Water Decentralization 
 At this current stage of negotiation, there are three proposed institutional models 
under consideration. Each proposal varies in it’s the delegation of powers between 
municipal governments on water provision. The first model, referred to as the 
“Metropolitan Entity of Solidarity,” centralizes all production and delivery of potable 
water across the region. This arrangement requires a common pool of representatives 
from each municipality, where decisions must be made collectively. Of the three 
proposals, the municipal government of La Paz has endorsed this combined entity – with 
the argument that a centralized system would bring economies-of-scale benefits, thus 
lowering the cost of water services. It is not surprising that La Paz would prefer this 
scheme, as the municipality often enjoys greater political leverage over El Alto (as La 
Paz is the nation’s capital). Yet, this enlarged model has its drawbacks, with critics 
finding the arrangement politically infeasible. As mentioned in an earlier section, the 
municipalities of El Alto and La Paz represent opposing political parties (and inherently 
separate political processes altogether). This poses a large constraint for cooperation 
within this proposed entity, and, in a way, it plants the seeds for its own failure.  
 The remaining two proposals separate responsibilities among the municipalities, 
whereby water is allocated in blocks to each local government.  Both the ministry and 
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regulator have favored this approach, as this arrangement would promote autonomous 
decision-making at the municipal level. The second model, or the so-called “Strategic 
Entity,” completely assigns water governance to each city – independent of one another. 
Engineers and planners have expressed caution about this model, as the existing 
infrastructure cannot be practically divided along municipal boundaries. In other words, 
the water system has already been physically integrated across the region; and therefore 
local governments must take an integrated approach towards policymaking.  
 The last model, taking the name “Decentralized Public Enterprises,” reconciles 
this concern. Here, two large public companies are formed: one centralized in La Paz, 
another in El Alto. Smaller satellite cities would be represented through the nearest 
entity, as system expansion will require cooperation from the population centers (either 
La Paz or El Alto) and outward (to smaller towns). This proposal matches the physical 
realities of the water infrastructure system, by linking local governments in relation to 
their relative proximity. In addition, the separation of responsibilities between La Paz and 
El Alto implicitly acknowledges the political polarization between the two municipalities.  
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Notes 
 
1
 Entidades Prestadoras de Servicios de Agua Potable y/o Alcantarillado Sanitario 
2
 [Author’s translation:] “In terms of water and sanitation, the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia has begun a very vigorous process of incorporation social sectors in the design of 
public policy, in the planning process, in operations and regulation, as well as process 
involving institutional management and/or in strengthening potable water and sanitation 
services.” MMAyA, 2013, Vol I, Section 2.1.1. 
3
 The US$9,562,000 in bonds corresponds to the debt of the Aguas del Illimani 
Consortium. The FNDR is primarily financed by the IFC, IDB and CAF. 
4
 Decreto Supremo No 0071: “Crea las Autoridades de Fiscalización y Control Social en 
los sectores de: Transportes y Telecomunicaciones; Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico; 
Electricidad; Bosques y Tierra; Pensiones; y Empresas; determina su estructura 
organizativa; define competencias y atribuciones,” Presidente del Estado Plurinacional de 
Bolivia (09 Abr 2009). 
5
  “Intervención de EPSAS,” La Razón (2013) 
 http://www.la-razon.com/opinion/editorial/Intervencion-EPSAS_0_1808219171.html 
6[Author’s translation:] “EPSAS has por investment, no capacity of returns on 
investment, the billing software is running the risk of collapse, it contaminates the 
environment […] it has poor risk management and fails the commitments made to the 
community.” 
 “Intervención de EPSAS,” La Razón (2013) 
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7
 [Author’s translation:] “Water is a fundamental right for life in the context of the 
sovereignty of the people. The State will promote water use and access based upon the 
basic principles of solidarity, equality, complementarity, reciprocity, equality, diversity, 
and sustainability.”  
8
 Lazar, 2008, 2.  
9
 [Author’s translation:] “The State will recognize, respect and protect the customary 
rights of the community, local authorities and of the indigenous farming organizations in 
terms of their rights, sustainable use and management of water.”  
10
 [For the full text of the 1906 Water Law, refer to:] OAS. “Ley de Aguas Vigente.” 
Organization of American States. Online (accessed 30 October 2013):  
< http://www.oas.org/dsd/environmentlaw/waterlaw/documents/bolivia-
ley_de_aguas_vigente_(1906).pdf > 
11
 [Capítulo 6:] OAS, “Ley de Aguas Vigente, Estado de Bolivia, 28 Nov 1906,” Online. 
12
 Crespo, 2013. 
13
 Formal title: “Ley marco de Autonomías y Decentralizacion ‘Andrés Ibáñez’” Ley No 
031, 19 Jul 2010. 
14
 [Author’s translation:] “Whereas, despite the cited constitutional mandate and 3 (three) 
years after the enactment of the political constitution of the state […] EPSAS did not 
follow the management models pointed out in the Carta Magna.” 
15
 [Author’s translation:] “Whereas, the deficient management of the enterprise not only 
seriously jeopardizes its services, but also compromises the economic resources of the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia that “nationalized” Aguas del Illimani and took control over 
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the company, not to manage it inefficiently or hand it over to groups of social, political, 
labor or economic power, but to adapt it to the mandates and principles of the political 
constitution of the State to materialize its fundamental rights, to the effect that the State, 
by means of the law, must return and pursue its role in the supervision and control over 
this enterprise, that so far has a resigning directorate, an abnormally designated general 
manager and marked by ineffective and inefficient management [sic].”  
16
 [Anexo 6-1, Evaluacion Institutional VII Sec 2.b:] MMAyA, 2013.  
17
 AAPS, 2013b 
18
 Crespo, 2013. 
19
 AAPS, “Etractura de Tarifas a Junio 2010,” Online: accessed 02 Nov 2013: 
http://www.aaps.gob.bo/bcko/data/sig/epsas/precios/1-precios.pdf 
   
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five 
The La Paz region has reached a critical juncture in urban infrastructure reform, 
as local municipalities will need to build consensus on a restructured water utility 
company. This process has implications that reach beyond the scope of water 
management, as it comes at a time of remarkable sociopolitical change. The backdrop is a 
decade of natural resource conflict has revitalized expectations on the state’s role in 
ensuring water access. The constitution of 2009 explicitly mentions these conflicts in its 
preamble, declaring that these social movements had “inspired” the referendum. Despite 
this sense of progress, normative goals on universal right for water are far from being 
actualized. Basic services in the peri-urban areas of El Alto and La Paz continue to lag 
behind, disproportionately affecting the urban poor. This, in part, has been the result of 
rapid and uncontrolled demographic growth in the region that has outpaced water sector 
development. Population pressures, however, do not entirely account for this institutional 
incapacity. Instead, the water crisis reflects a far-reaching governance failure: as it not 
only undermines local water services, but moreover, challenges the nation-building 
process as a whole.  
In the context of the La Paz-El Alto water sector, the outcomes of infrastructure 
reform are tied the larger political transition of the Bolivian state, and its goals of 
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plurinational democracy and local decision-making. This thesis brings forth several 
propositions: (1) demands for social inclusion in urban development have been at the 
forefront of the recent water conflicts, given the intrinsic relationship of water access and 
poverty; and, (2) given these demands, efforts toward infrastructure reform must promote 
inclusion through water affordability and service expansion, keeping in mind long-term 
system viability. In the case of the Aguas del Illimani concession, social protests came in 
reaction to the relaxed service-expansion mandates for the private provider. Exclusion 
from the system was also determined by new connection fees, which was a regressive 
consequence of infrastructure expansion. In other words, the concessionaire would have 
more of an incentive to expand service in wealthier neighborhoods, as there would be a 
greater number of new connections per given area –compared to a more dispersed, low-
income area.  
The public provider, EPSAS, has not shown promising results in meeting the 
demands for system expansion. As the previous chapter points out, EPSAS was initially 
intended to manage the system for a short-term period of six months, and therefore the 
company had no long-term expansion mandates. Notwithstanding the pressing water 
needs within peri-urban areas, the provider operates on an astonishingly high surplus, 
where revenues exceed costs by almost twofold. This problem of underinvestment, for 
the most part, reflects the lack of robust oversight on the utility operator. Kessides (2004) 
points out that public monopolies generally have incentives to overcharge customers with 
no alternative water supply. With this in mind, the regulator must place enforceable 
performance targets on the operator, which includes aspects of system efficiency and 
expansion. In the case of EPSAS, such performance targets were not defined or enforced 
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by the regulator (AAPS). The utility company therefore was oriented for short-term 
planning, rather than meeting the expectations envisaged by the Morales government, 
such as universal access to water. As stakeholders are now negotiating for a reformed 
model of water management, the comprehensiveness of public oversight must not be 
overlooked. 
This tale of La Paz water management offers valuable insight into the political 
economy behind urban infrastructure reform. Here, the question is asked on why water 
services continue to fall short of expectations, despite such political will to ensure 
universal water access. Months after the exit of Aguas del Illimani, a public provider was 
almost immediately established to assume operations. This prompt nationalization, 
however, left some unfinished work. Legislation governing the sector continues to be 
outdated and unfit for a new regulatory environment: for consideration, the current water 
services law (Ley 2066) was enacted in 2000 to regulate private water companies, with 
its language directly contradicting the 2009 constitution. In addition, AAPS has lacked 
the administrative resources to fulfill its regulatory mandates. As mentioned, only 30 of 
the 672 registered water providers are actually being regulated across the country 
(MMAyA, 2013, Annexo 6). More specifically, in the case of La Paz, the regulator 
deferred its intervention of EPSAS six years after it had not fulfilled its mandate to 
decentralize to the municipal level.  
With the benefit of hindsight, a bundle of lessons may be drawn from the Bolivian 
experience with infrastructure reform. First, these aforementioned shortcomings, to a 
large extent, may perhaps be attributed to a widespread overconfidence in publicly-run 
companies alone to achieve policy goals. This is evident through the government’s 
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immediate nationalization of the water sector, without developing the legal framework or 
regulatory environment to accommodate reform. To simply put it, means became the 
ends. Rather than implementing a public sector led strategy to solve the urban water 
crisis, nationalization became an end in its own right. This may have been a result of the 
political momentum of the time, with an overwhelming backlash against water 
privatization. The introduction of a public provider, however, should not substitute the 
role of a regulator. In the case of La Paz, as this thesis illustrates, EPSAS had insufficient 
public oversight, even though it operated as a publicly-owned company. With these 
considerations, efforts to nationalize water infrastructure must further develop the 
regulatory regime: in respect to both its administrative resources and legal authority. 
Decentralization of water services has become a recent priority of the MAS 
government, opening an opportunity for municipal-level infrastructure reform. The 
constitutional referendum of 2009 assigns responsibilities of basic services to the 
municipality, while the regulator’s intervention seeks to actualize this goal.  Moving 
forward, stakeholders must agree on model of water governance, and thereby set the 
balance between system integration and local autonomy. In the case of La Paz, the water 
system is inherently integrated and therefore the resource should be governed as such. 
Yet, the complexity brought political and social fragmentation should not be dismissed 
throughout this process of decentralization. For this reason, the national government must 
assume a facilitative role to enable municipal capacity-building, for the improvement of 
water management.  
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